Introduction
The Social Security earnings test determines how work affects the time path of payments to beneficiaries. For annual earnings above a threshold amount, benefits are clawed back.
Although the benefit reductions are returned, with an actuarial adjustment, in future years, the test is widely viewed as a pure tax on earnings.
1 For this reason, there has been longstanding interest in the extent to which the Social Security earnings test affects the labor supply of Social Security beneficiaries.
The Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 abolished the test for individuals who are at or above the Full Benefit Age (FBA), traditionally 65, but currently 67. This policy generated a series of studies on the impact of the change on labor supply and earnings for those 65 and older (Song and Manchester, 2007; Haider and Loughran, 2008; Engelhardt and Kumar, 2009; Gelber, Jones, and Sacks, 2013; among others) . Overall, these studies found that the repeal of the test increased earnings by 8-20 percent and annual hours of work by 5-16 percent for men over the FBA, with comparable estimates for earnings for women claiming on their own earnings histories (Engelhardt and Kumar, 2014) . In contrast, there has been little empirical work done on individuals under the FBA, primarily because there is no policy variation at the federal level that differentially affects individuals who claim early. In this paper, we present new evidence on the impact of the earnings test on men who have claimed benefits early by exploiting variation in the threshold number of annual hours at which the test just binds, induced by state and federal changes in the real value of the effective minimum wage.
We make three primary contributions to the literature. First, we use data from from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and 1992-2014 from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to document that a large fraction of men who claim early and continue to work have hourly wages close to the minimum wage. Second, for any fixed earnings-test threshold amount, an increase in the hourly wage at which a beneficiary can work reduces the number of annual hours needed to hit the threshold. Hence, labor-market policies that target hourly wages may interact with the structure of the earnings test to affect equilibrium hours and employment 1 It is unclear the extent to which older Americans understand, in principle, that lost benefits may be returned in the future. For example, Gruber and Orszag (2003) and Figinski (2012) have argued that tax-preparation guides for the public view the test as a pure tax. In addition, Liebman and Luttmer (2011) found that while 62 percent respondents in their survey of Social Security knowledge were generally aware of the earnings test, just 39 percent knew that lost benefits are fully returned to beneficiaries with an actuarial adjustment. The earnings test as a pure tax becomes a better first-order approximation, the less aware the public is of this feature.
for beneficiaries. Third, we exploit this feature of the test and use substantial state-by-calendar year variation in the real effective minimum wage-the higher of the state and federal minimafrom increases in the minimum wage, which lower the threshold level of hours at which the earnings test binds, to identify the impact of the test on labor supply on the intensive and extensive margins for men who claim early.
Finally, most studies analyze the earnings test for an individual beneficiary under a standard static unitary labor supply model, with a linear budget set, and no saving. In this framework, individuals can smoothly alter their labor supply-there are no adjustment costs and no labor-market rigidities. However, we present evidence from the HRS that a substantial proportion of 62-to 64-year old men report rigidities in their choice of hours, which implies that the earnings test may have asymmetric impacts on labor supply, especially around full-time, fullyear hours. We then present empirical evidence to support this view. When the minimum wage increases and pushes threshold hours below full-time, full-year hours, the likelihood of working full-time, full-year falls by 30 percentage points; when the minimum wage decreases and pushes threshold hours above full-time, full-year hours, the likelihood of working full-time, full-year rises by 20 percentage points. There are similar asymmetric effects around full-time, full-year hours for annual hours and employment, respectively.
Overall, the estimates imply economically large impacts of the earnings test on the hours and employment for men who claim Social Security benefits early. We temper this conclusion with the following caveat: although economically meaningful, the estimated impacts are in some cases imprecise enough that firm conclusions cannot be drawn, especially when we use men of a similar age who have not claimed benefits, and thus are not subject to the earnings test, as a comparison group. In this dimension, our study is somewhat underpowered, and some of our results bear further investigation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents background on the earnings test. Section 3 lays out the basic theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the data and gives preliminary empirical results. Sections 5 and 6 outline the regression framework, estimates, and robustness checks. There is a brief conclusion. group is composed of beneficiaries who will not reach the FBA during the calendar year, the parameters for which are shown in columns 1-3. This group is comprised overwhelmingly of 62-64 year old beneficiaries. For this group, there has been little policy variation at the national level. The benefit reduction rate has remained the same across years, while the nominal threshold amount has risen. The dashed line in Figure 1 shows the real value of the threshold, using the all-items CPI as the deflator. There has been some time-series variation in the real threshold, but that may be of limited value in identifying the impact of the earnings test, since other time-series changes affecting the labor market for older workers over the last three decades might confound this variation.
The second group in Table 2 are beneficiaries who have attained the FBA for the full calendar year, the parameters for which are shown in columns 4-6. This group is comprised overwhelmingly of 66-69 year old beneficiaries. For this group, there has been significant policy variation. The Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 abolished the test for individuals who are at or above the Full Benefit Age (FBA), traditionally 65, but currently 67. This generated a series of studies on the impact of the law change on labor supply and earnings for those 65 and older (Song and Manchester, 2007; Haider and Loughran, 2008; Engelhardt and Kumar, 2009; Figinski, 2012; Gelber, Jones, and Sacks, 2013) . Overall, these studies found that the repeal of the test increased earnings by 8-20 percent and annual hours by 5-16 percent for men over the FBA, with comparable estimates for earnings for women claiming on their own earnings histories (Engelhardt and Kumar, 2014 
Theoretical Framework
To illustrate the basic effects of a change in the minimum wage, we follow the previous literature and view the test as a pure tax on earnings. In particular, Figure The key insight we exploit in the empirical analysis is that the minimum wage and the earnings test threshold interact to alter the labor-leisure tradeoff: as the minimum wage rises (falls), the threshold number of hours falls (rises), and the location of the interior kink changes.
Therefore, to the extent that individuals bunch at the kinks, reduced-form empirical analysis of the impact of the minimum wage on labor supply will measure the uncompensated labor supply response to these changes in kinks.
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Data and Preliminary Analysis
The primary data are for 64-year old male beneficiaries from the 1983-2017 waves of the IPUMS March CPS ASEC supplement (Ruggles et al., 2017) . These individuals were born between 1918 and 54. We focus on men, because most men in these birth cohorts claimed on their own earnings histories, which simplifies the analysis. Although women are an understudied group in the earnings-test literature, we leave the analysis of their responses to future research.
The main advantage of the CPS is that it provides large samples of older individuals, but it presents three measurement challenges. First, the CPS does not provide the birth month in the public-use data, so we do not know ages exactly. This means that we neither are able to calculate the FBA for each individual, nor determine precisely who is eligible to claim early benefits. Consequently, we cannot reliably include 62-and 65-year olds in the analysis sample, because we cannot be sure they faced the earnings test for the calendar year for which income and hours are measured. Second, for those reporting Social Security benefit receipt, there is no information on the age at which benefits were claimed. Third, the March supplement asks about annual income and hours in the previous calendar year. We use the income questions on receipt of Social Security benefits to determine beneficiary status and, hence, who faces the earnings test. Roughly ten-twelfths of 64-year olds interviewed in March were 63-year olds in the previous calendar year, for which they reported their income and hours. The other two-twelfths turned 64 in January or February (or even in early March), just before the March interview, and hence, would have been 62-year olds in the previous calendar year that references the income and hours data. Due to this wedge in the timing of the income and hours information and the date of the interview, we focus on 64-year olds to ensure that the income and hours data apply to individuals who would have been subject to the earnings test. Table 3 provides summary descriptive statistics for the full sample and the subsamples of Social Security beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
To supplement the analysis, we also in places draw on data from the 1982-2016 monthly CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) from the NBER and the 1992-2014 waves of the HRS. The primary advantage of the MORG data is that it provides significantly larger samples of individuals than the annual supplement to the March CPS; the primary disadvantage is that the MORG data do not include enough information to construct measures of annual income and hours. The primary advantages of the HRS are exact months and years of birth and claiming, respectively, and detailed information on hourly wages and hours' constraints on the job. The main drawback of the HRS is that it generates small samples relative to the CPS.
In order for changes in the minimum wage to identify meaningful labor-supply effects for early claimants, there are three necessary conditions. First, there has to be substantial bunching at the interior kink point. Previous studies have documented substantial bunching of earnings and hours associated with the earnings test threshold (e.g., Friedberg, 2000; Haider and Loughran, 2008; Engelhardt and Kumar, 2009; Gelber, Jones, Sacks, 2013; among others) . Second, there must be substantial variation in minimum hours, min h . The solid line in Figure 1 shows the aggregate national time series of the real value of the effective minimum wage from 1982-2016, defined as the higher of the state and federal minima. The series was constructed using the monthly CPS MORG data from 1982-2016. For each state and month, the higher of the applicable nominal state and federal minimum wage rates was assigned to each ORG respondent. These minimum wages were then inflated into real 2016 dollars using the monthly all-items Consumer Price Index (CPI), and then the real wage data were weighted by the CPS sampling weight and collapsed into annual data. Therefore, the series in the figure represents the state-employment-weighted annual average national real minimum wage.
The real minimum wage follows a saw-toothed pattern that results from increases in the federal minimum wage in the 1990s, slowly eroded by inflation, and increases in state minimum wages that went into effect for some states and occurred primarily after the 1990s. Overall, there is significant state-by-year variation in the effective minimum wage that underlies the series.
Using this series, the real threshold series in Figure 1 , and equation (1), the dashed line in Figure   5 shows the annual time series for minimum hours, min h . There is substantial variation in minimum hours across years that varies inversely with the real minimum wage (the solid line in the figure). Up until 2000, a beneficiary had to work 1400-1800 hours at the minimum wage to hit the earnings-test threshold; higher-wage workers needed even fewer hours. After 2000, closer to full-time, full-year hours (2080 hours) were needed to hit the threshold at the minimum wage. earn at or just above the minimum wage, and will be affected by changes in the minimum wage directly or through spillovers to wages above the minimum (Lee, 1999; Autor, Manning, and Smith, 2016; Engelhardt and Purcell, 2018) . 
Regression Specification and Estimation Results
To capture the basic theoretical mechanism, we begin with the following reduced-form regression specification: The first row of column 1 of Table 4 shows the probit estimates of the parameters in (2) for the sample of beneficiaries, when the dependent variable measures the extensive margin: an indicator for whether the beneficiary worked for pay at any point during the year. Since the identifying variation is state-by-year, the standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. The marginal effect of a 260-hour increase in minimum hours-roughly one standard deviation, based on the summary statistics in the first row of Table 3 -is shown in square brackets. This base specification excludes the demographic variables (X) in (2). The estimated marginal effect of an increase in minimum hours is to raise the likelihood of working by 14.3 percentage points. This impact is statistically different than zero at the 7 percent level of significance and is economically large relative to the mean share working of 28.5 percent.
Column 3 extends the specification by adding controls for demographics. Columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 4 show a parallel set of estimates for 64-year men who were not beneficiaries. These men are not subject to the earnings test and potentially serve as a control group to the extent they are similar to beneficiaries in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics. Comparing columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 , beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries are similar along observed characteristics, with two exceptions: non-beneficiaries are less likely to be veterans and more likely to be college educated. Across columns 2, 4, and 6
in Table 4 , changes in minimum hours have little impact on the likelihood of employment for non-beneficiaries. The estimated marginal effects are economically small and not statistically different than zero at conventional significance levels. The second row in the table shows the pvalue for the test of the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates for minimum hours are equal across the beneficiary and non-beneficiary samples. Unfortunately, the estimates are somewhat underpowered: even though the point estimates differ across samples, those differences are not statistically different from each other. Table 5 shows Tobit estimates of the parameters in (2) when the dependent variable is annual hours. The pattern of point estimates is similar to that in Table 4 , showing economically large marginal effects of changes in minimum hours on annual hours for beneficiaries, but not for non-beneficiaries. However, none of these differences are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance.
Extensions and Robustness Checks
Overall, the baseline estimates in Tables 4 and 5 are suggestive of important impacts on equilibrium hours and employment, but not conclusive. In this section, we extend the analysis and provide an important robustness check.
Although the labor-supply framework illustrated in Figure 2 has been the basis for essentially all of the last two decades' literature on the earnings test, one of its limitations is the assumption that individuals can smoothly adjust their hours when incentives change. There is a long literature in labor economics that examines constraints in hours, for example, Altonji and Paxson (1988) , Cogan (1981) , Card (1990) , Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) , and Hurd (1996) , among others. If hours are constrained, then portions of the budget sets in Figure 2 may not be available. As a hypothetical, Figure 10 illustrates the budget sets in Figure 2 , subject to two constraints: hours can be adjusted above, but not below full-time hours; hours choices between part-time and full-time hours are not available. Now, when the minimum wage rises and minimum hours fall, the kink at B is no longer available. In this type of scenario, changes in the minimum hours may induce large changes in labor supply, up to full-time, full-year hours, or down to part-time or even no hours, depending on the size of the change in minimum hours, what sections of the budget set are available, and how close minimum hours are to full-time, fullyear hours. In particular, in the presence of constraints on hours, there may be significant asymmetry in the impact of changes in minimum hours on annual hours and employment as minimum hours rises (falls) above (below) full-time, full-year hours.
To gauge the importance of hours' constraints, the first two rows and columns (panel A)
in Table 6 To examine asymmetries in response to change in minimum hours, Columns 2, 4, and 6 show estimates for the isomorphic specifications for the sample of nonbeneficiaries. While there is little evidence of asymmetry within these samples, the p-values for the tests of equal impact across samples (in rows 2 and 4) continue to show that the analysis is somewhat underpowered: the differences in parameter estimates across samples, though economically large, are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
An important maintained assumption throughout the empirical analysis is that the sample of beneficiaries is exogenous and that the timing benefit claiming is not correlated with changes in minimum hours. In particular, Gruber and Orszag (2003) found that claiming increased when the test was less binding. To address this, we show in column 1 of Table 8 
and the parameters are estimated on panel data on 62-year old men from the HRS, who are followed until they claim benefits. 5 Importantly, in this hazard framework, a test of the null hypothesis that 1 γ = is a test of the null that claiming is uncorrelated with changes in minimum
hours. The first row shows the estimate of γ , with the standard error in parentheses, and the marginal effect, measured as
in square brackets, where min h is the sample mean minimum hours, and 260 is the sample standard deviation. So, the marginal effect represents a one-standard-deviation increase in minimum hours above the mean. The estimate in column 1 is not statistically different from 1, based on the standard error, and the estimated marginal effect is economically small. Column 2 shows a parallel set of estimates when breaking minimum hours into its two components above and below full-time, full-year hours. Again, there is no statistically significant correlation between minimum hours and the timing of claiming, lending support to the assumption that the sample of beneficiaries is exogenous.
Discussion and Caveats
In this paper, we examine how the earnings test affects the hours and employment of men who claim early benefits. For any fixed earnings-test threshold amount, an increase in the hourly wage at which a beneficiary can work reduces the number of annual hours needed to hit the threshold. We exploit this feature of the test and use substantial state-by-calendar year variation from increases in the minimum wage, which lower the threshold level of hours at which the earnings test binds, to identify the impact of the test on labor supply on the intensive and extensive margins for men who claim early. We also present evidence from the HRS that a These conclusions are tempered by the following caveats. First, the estimates reflect equilibrium effects on hours and employment, because changes in the minimum wage also induce changes in labor demand. To the extent there are disemployment effects from the minimum wage that affect older workers, those effects will be subsumed in our reduced-form estimates. Although we couch our discussion of in terms of labor supply, technically we do not separately identify supply and demand effects. Second, although economically meaningful, the estimated impacts are in some cases imprecise enough that firm conclusions cannot be drawn, especially when we use men of a similar age who have not claimed benefits, and thus are not subject to the earnings test, as a comparison group. In this dimension, our study is somewhat underpowered, and some of our results bear further investigation. Finally, we do not examine the hours and employment response of women. A careful treatment of this important, but relatively underexplored, aspect of the earnings test should be a key focus of future research. 
